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ABSTRACT 
The term “human security” first officially appeared on the scene of international 
relations in 1994, with a report by the UN Human Development Program. The concept 
has fast been gaining supporters and sparking associated intellectual debate. It challenges 
the traditional concept of security by contending that the central focus of security efforts 
should be the individual human being, not the nation state, as has been–and remains–the 
typical focus of analysis. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the doctrine of 
“human security,” which has been featured in official policy statements of the European 
Union (EU), is not yet well formulated. Partly because it is inconsistently defined, it has 
been difficult to implement. Four criticisms stand out: namely, that the “human security” 
concept is vague, incoherent, arbitrary and difficult to operationalize. The EU has 
nonetheless attempted to make “human security” an element of its European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), with mixed results–reservations as to its limitations and 
acknowledgements of its achievements. 
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The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as 
security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national 
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear 
holocaust....Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people 
who sought security in their daily lives.1  
The term “human security” officially appeared on the scene of international 
relations in 1994, and it has fast been gaining supporters and sparking associated 
intellectual debate. It challenges the traditional concept of security by contending that the 
central focus of security efforts should be the individual human being, not the nation 
state, as has been–and remains–the typical unit of analysis. This thesis investigates the 
hypothesis that the doctrine of “human security,” which is gaining support in the 
European Union’s official policy statements, is not yet well formulated and therefore 
difficult to implement. 
This topic is important because the European Union (EU) is a major economic 
power that has been developing what it terms a European Security and Defense Policy 
since 1999. The first deployment of European Union troops under the ESDP was for 
“EUFOR Concordia.” In this operation, the EU employed NATO assets in March 2003 in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It was considered a success and replaced 
by a smaller EU police mission, “EUPOL Proxima,” in December 2003. Since December 
2004, the EU has deployed peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with 
NATO in the “EUFOR Althea” mission. From May to September 2003, the EU 
conducted its first operation without the use of NATO assets: “Operation Artemis” in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under UN Security Council Resolution 1484. 
This laid the framework for a system to be used in future ESDP operations. In 2006, the 
EU returned to the DRC with “EUFOR RD Congo,” which supported the UN mission 
there during the country's troubled elections. The EU has conducted additional ESDP  
 
                                                 
1 Human Development Report (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press for the United Nations 
Development Programme, 1994), 22; emphasis added. 
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missions outside the Balkans and the DRC in Georgia, Indonesia, Palestine, Moldova, 
and Sudan, among other places. There is also a current judicial mission in Iraq entitled 
“EUJUST Lex,” as well as “EULEX” in Kosovo. 
A. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Any concept that is heralded as possibly “new and improved” has its naysayers, 
and should spark healthy academic debate. “Human security” is no exception. Criticism 
has come both from organizations and people involved with the development and 
promotion of the concept, as well as from disinterested specialists in security studies. 
Four criticisms stand out: namely, that the “human security” notion is vague, incoherent, 
arbitrary and difficult to operationalize. This thesis investigates whether these criticisms 
are justified. If the concept is indeed poorly formulated, this may explain the difficulties 
encountered in its implementation. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first prominent use of the term “human security” was in a document called 
the Human Development Report prepared for the United Nations Development Program’s 
1994 Social Summit in Copenhagen.2 This report declared that: 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as 
security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national 
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear 
holocaust....Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people 
who sought security in their daily lives.3 
This report and the definition of “human security” that it put forward focused 
simultaneously on the notions of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” which 
are two of the major diverging guidelines on the concept. Another divergence would be  
 
 
                                                 
2 Sabina Alkire claims that the term was in circulation earlier. Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual 
Framework for Human Security, Working Paper No. 2 (Oxford, England: Centre for Research on 
Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, 2003), 13. 
3 Human Development Report 1994, 22; emphasis added. 
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the “narrow” versus the “broad” approaches. Certain countries and international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank have also given considerable time and effort to 
examining the concept of human security. 
At the onset, the notion of “human security” was defined as a wholly civilian 
concept with no military aspects attached to it, and this stretched the idea of “security” so 
much that it appeared to include almost everything–except military affairs. This early 
definition drew the criticism that the concept of “human security” was too broad and 
practically impossible to operationalize. As Sabina Alkire, an economist and current 
director of the Oxford Policy and Human Development Initiative at Oxford University, 
succinctly observes, “the surrounding discussions of the 1994 report, and in particular the 
breadth and apparent arbitrariness of the original seven dimensions, have led others to 
judge the concept of human security to be too all-encompassing for practical purposes, 
the report idealistic, and its recommendations naïve.”4  
It was not until 1996-1997 that the concept was reevaluated and reshaped into a 
more solid and project-oriented approach to security.5 This was done largely by Canadian 
experts and officials, who remain among the theory’s main and most fervent supporters. 
In 1998, a meeting in Norway of representatives of eleven nations focused on efforts to 
achieve international recognition of–and cooperation on–the issues affecting civilian 
populations in war zones such as landmines and child soldiers.6 The participants 
expressed an intention to heighten international awareness of these issues, and they 
became the core of the emerging “human security” network. Through subsequent 
meetings and continuing collaboration, this group of countries made significant strides 
towards refining the theory of “human security” and gaining support for corresponding 
tasks. According to Janne Haaland Matlary, a professor of international politics at the  
 
 
                                                 
4 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 14. 
5 Janne Haaland Matlary, “Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” International 
Affairs (2008): 136. 
6 Ibid. 
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University of Oslo and senior adjunct researcher in security policy at the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, some even initiated “national ‘human security’ projects 
both inside and outside the UN structures.”7 
An even larger role in the popularization of the “human security” concept was 
played by an organization called the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). This organization in 2001 published a report entitled The 
Responsibility to Protect, which firmly underlined an international ethical obligation to 
defend and protect individual human beings when national governments fail to do so. 
However, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 
temporarily deflected attention away from the discussion of “human security.” 
In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a 
report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, which revitalized the 
debate about “human security” by continuing the work started by the ICISS. This report 
asserted that the model of sovereignty has evolved to include a sense of ethical 
obligations. That is, the sovereign state must be held responsible for the “human security” 
of its citizens. This document differed from and improved upon its predecessor by 
acknowledging and incorporating both the newer concept of “human security” and the 
traditional concept of “state security.” 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) policy document of 2003 did not 
specifically mention the term “human security,” but it did advocate “building an 
international order” which is “rule-based” and supported by “effective multilateralism.”8 
In 2004, a special report was commissioned to evaluate how the ESS could be revised to 
have a “human security” foundation and effectiveness. It was called A Human Security 
Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security 
Capabilities. According to Janne Haaland Matlary, the Barcelona Report “represents the 
first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on individual rights to 
security–not only in terms of policy and legal principles (as the ICISS report does) but 
                                                 
7 Matlary, “Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” 136. 
8 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: European Council: 
December 12, 2003), 14. 
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also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration.”9 The Barcelona Report states, 
“In today’s world, there is a gap between current security capabilities, consisting largely 
of military forces, and real security needs.”10 The newly issued European Security 
Strategy of 2008 does, however, make reference to “human security,” which implies that 
the doctrine is indeed gaining in importance.11 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
A critical conceptual analysis is undertaken to test the logical coherence of the 
propositions advanced by the proponents of the “human security” doctrine. The practical 
applicability of the as yet rather vague and general presumptions is also examined. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses the historical evolution of 
the “human security” concept as well as the various definitions and key statements that 
have been advanced to date. This chapter also includes an assessment of the major texts 
and specifies the core ideas. Chapter III offers an analysis of critical interpretations of the 
concept, including responses to the criticisms and concerns. Chapter IV provides a 
summary and conclusion. 
                                                 
9 Matlary, “Much Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” 139. 
10 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities (Barcelona: Caixa de Catalunya, 2004), 8 (section 2.1). 
11 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing 
World (Brussels: European Council, December 11, 2008), 2, 8. 
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II. DEFINITIONS AND CORE IDEAS 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a survey of definitions of human security. It 
presents a review of related but differing approaches and identifies the core ideas that are 
critically examined in Chapter III. 
A. BASIC DEFINITION OF THE TERM  
However recent the apparition of the term on the international academic and 
political scene, it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the question of whether it is 
indeed a new concept. After all, is not “human insecurity” a concept as old as time itself? 
Have not the threats of famine, disease, pain and death, whether caused simply by the 
cold and harshness of the elements, or inflicted by ravenous wild animals or indeed other 
people by negligence, war, or torture been a part of the human condition since time 
immemorial? Do not all human beings desire to live out their lives in relative comfort 
with in peace with others, and abhor the concepts of fear, pain and death, especially when 
the latter are inflicted by others for their own ends? It is entirely possible that this “human 
security” or the removal thereof has been so to speak an aspect of war since the beginning 
of time. Therefore, one might ask why in a world still so much in need of truly protecting 
and taking care of the individual human being so much time is wasted discussing the 
matter, vice doing something about it. As Ann Florini, a senior foreign policy fellow at 
the Brookings Institution, and P. J. Simmons, a founding director of the Managing Global 
Issues project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, commented in their 
thorough evaluation of various definitions and debates about security, there is “too much 
disagreement” and not enough action in general.12  
Some trace the conceptual origins of the modern “human security” concept back 
to the “Four Freedoms” speech given by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the U.S. 
Congress on the January 6, 1941. In this speech, President Roosevelt declared that:  
                                                 
12Ann Florini and P. J. Simmons, “The New Security Thinking: A Review of the North American 
Literature,” Project on World Security (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1998), 44, in Alkire, A 
Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 9. 
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In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a 
world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom 
of speech and expression–everywhere in the world. The second is freedom 
of every person to worship God in his own way–everywhere in the world. 
The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means 
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy 
peacetime life for its inhabitants-everywhere in the world. The fourth is 
freedom from fear–which, translated into world terms, means a world-
wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough 
fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical 
aggression against any neighbor–anywhere in the world.13  
The latter two goals, i.e., “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” would 
prove to figure prominently as two diverging paths in the discussion of “human security” 
today.  However, the roots of the human security concept can be followed back much 
more deeply through the very etymology of the word “security,” which comes from the 
Latin securus. This can be broken down into its components “se” meaning “without,” and 
“cura” meaning “care.”14 According to P. H. Liotta, a Professor of Humanities at Salve 
Regina University and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations 
and Public Policy, even Cicero discussed the notion of security in terms of “the absence 
of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends.”15  
In ethical terms, therefore, human security can be viewed as “both a ‘system’ and 
a systemic practice that promotes and sustains stability, security, and progressive 
integration of individuals within their relationships to their states, societies, and 
regions.”16 There seems to be little to begrudge in such an ideology. As Liotta adds, “the 
right of states to protect themselves” under the guise of “national security” and to employ 
traditional instruments of power, often at the expense of enemy combatants and civilians, 
has “never been directly, or sufficiently, challenged.”17 According to Liotta, it is of note 
                                                 
13 American Rhetoric, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm. 
14 Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
15 P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security,” Security 
Dialogue 33, no. 4 (2002): 477. 
16 P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 
Parameters 36, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 87. 
17 Ibid., 88. 
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“that such a challenge is absent despite some recent catastrophic failures of state-based 
security protection (such as Rwanda, Northern Uganda, and Darfur), where the state 
either has been unwilling or unable to protect, or even has been antagonistic against, its 
citizens.”18 However, perhaps precisely the emergence of the human security debate is 
such a challenge. 
B. “TRADITIONAL SECURITY” VS. “HUMAN SECURITY” 
Traditional, or “national” or “state,” security has been a predominant 
preoccupation in international relations since the emergence of nation-states, which is 
sometimes described as having occurred with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.19 The 
central idea revolves around external threats to a nation-state and its citizens, and its 
ability to withstand such aggression, but the state also acted as a protector of citizens 
from internal threats. The state was supposed to protect individuals from threats 
regardless of their origin, whether a local thug or a neighboring country’s army. But since 
the state was the sole protector, in a time before the emergence of effective supra- and 
international organizations, this sometimes came at a price to the individual-essentially 
security of the collective bested the safety of the individual.20 According to Liotta, some 
scholars have argued that human security has its “roots in a neo-Marxist critique of the 
1970s,” but he argues that it can reasonably be shown that “human security is a principle 
embedded in Enlightenment Liberalism.”21 
Many different theories, including Realism, Idealism and Constructivism, have 
emerged as to the origins of these threats and how they should be perceived and dealt 
with, but the common factor among them is the absolute primacy of the nation-state. The 
proponents of human security theory fundamentally challenge this way of thinking. 
However, this not to say that the concepts of “state security” and “human security” are 
                                                 
18 Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 88. 
19 Martin Wight and other historians maintain that the modern Western states-system emerged at the 
end of the fifteenth century. See Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. by Hedley Bull (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1977), 112-113, 150-152. 
20 Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 89. 
21 Ibid. 
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mutually exclusive, or cannot coexist. As a matter of fact, there are several good 
arguments as to why “state security” and “human security” need each other. As Alkire 
puts it, “protecting others’ human security strengthens the security of national 
populations and thus would be in the self-interest of the nation-state, because it would be 
significantly less costly than countering violence or terrorism.”22 As Benjamin Franklin 
reflected, those who would give up essential liberty to increase their security deserve 
neither.23 It seems obvious even at this point in this study that, as with most things in life, 
a wise balance must be struck between state security and human security. 
The end of the Cold War and the bipolar East-West competition had a dramatic 
impact on security studies. Traditional, relatively narrow, definitions of security, which 
focused mainly on military might, were suddenly challenged by modern, broader 
theories, which took into account political, social, cultural, environmental, and 
informational factors.24 One of the trailblazers in this regard was British international 
relations theorist Barry Buzan, who together with such noted scholars as Ole Weaver, 
Japp de Wilde, and Bill McSweeney, co-founded the so-called “Copenhagen School” of 
security thinking in the early 1990s.25 Karina P. Marczuk, Deputy Director of the Office 
of the Secretary of the State, National Security Bureau, Poland, draws a direct link to 
human security by stating that the “broad security conception is followed by the modern 
human security theory which is a consequence of Barry Buzan’s approach to the security 
matters.”26 In 1995, Emma Rothschild, a British economic historian and current chair of 
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, discussed the broadening 
of the field of security studies as follows: 
                                                 
22 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 33. 
23 Written sometime shortly before February 17, 1775 as part of his notes for a proposition at the 
Pennsylvania Assembly, as published in Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin (1818), 
www.archive.org/details/templefranklin02franrich. 
24 Karina P. Marczuk, “Origin, Development and Perspectives for the Human Security Concept in the 
European Union,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 7, no. 2 (2007): 16. 
25 For more information on the Copenhagen School see Matt McDonald, The Copenhagen School and 
the Construction of Security, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA, February 28, 2007, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181067_index.html. 
26 Marczuk, “Origin, Development and Perspectives for the Human Security Concept in the European 
Union,” 16; emphasis in original. 
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The ubiquitous idea, in the new principles of the 1990s, is of security in an 
“extended” sense. The extension takes four main forms. In the first, the 
concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security 
of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to 
individuals. In the second, it is extended form the security of nations to the 
security of the international system, or of a supranational physical 
environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The 
extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be 
ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended 
horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different 
entities (such as individuals, nations, and “systems”) cannot be expected to 
be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended 
therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or 
“human” security. In a fourth operation, the political responsibility for 
ensuring security (or for invigilating all these “concepts of security”) is 
itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, 
including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or 
local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to 
public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of the market.27 
Thus, Marczuk concludes 
that [the] post-Cold War conception of security was called broad, wide, 
complex or extended, but the main idea was always the same after the 
collapse of the bipolar system, security should be understood as covering 
all the aspects of our daily life. Thus the human security theory could 
emerge and become popular in the 90s, particularly in Western European 
countries (EU), Canada, Japan, and the Third-World.28 
P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, a doctoral candidate at Oxford University, affirm, “In 
pragmatic ways, the broad conceptualization of human security is revolutionary–and quite 
different from a traditional, state-centric view of security. Most notably, perhaps, it brings 
what are traditionally considered ‘development’ or ‘humanitarian’ considerations, into 
the security discourse.”29  
                                                 
27 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995): 55. 
28 Marczuk, “Origin, Development and Perspectives for the Human Security Concept in the European 
Union,” 18. 
29 Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 87. 
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C. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROPER TERM AND CONCEPT 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the first prominent use of the term “human security” 
was in a document called the Human Development Report (HDR) prepared for the United 
Nations Development Program’s 1994 Social Summit in Copenhagen.30 One of the main 
authors of this document was Mahbub ul Haq, a noted Pakistani economist who was not 
only the founder of the series of periodic UNDP Human Development Reports, but also a 
champion of Human Development Theory and one of the originators of the Human 
Development Index, which has been used as a standardized measure of human 
development worldwide. The 1994, HDR defined human security as follows:  
Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And 
second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life–whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such 
threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.31 
Thus, the definition of human security put forward focused simultaneously on the notions 
of “freedom from fear” (which was paraphrased in the first point) and “freedom from 
want” (in the second point). The report went on to specify and discuss seven main areas 
of threat to individual human beings: “Economic Security,” “Food Security,” “Health 
Security,” “Environmental Security,” “Personal Security,” “Community Security,” and 
finally “Political Security.” Additionally four essential characteristics of human security 
were emphasized: the universality of the concern, the interdependency of the components 
of the ideology, the desirability of early prevention vice later intervention, and the fact 
that the concept is “people-centered.”32 The report also points out that U.S. Secretary of 
State Edward R. Stettinius echoed President Roosevelt’s “four freedoms” language in his 
June 1945 report on the San Francisco Conference at which the United Nations was 
founded: 
                                                 
30 Sabina Alkire states that the term was in circulation earlier. Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for 
Human Security, 13. 
31 Human Development Report 1994, 23. 
32 Ibid., 22-23. 
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The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security 
front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic 
and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on 
both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace…. No provisions 
that can be written into the [United Nations] Charter will enable the 
Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women 
have no security in their homes and their jobs.33 
As noted in Chapter I, human security was originally defined as a wholly civilian 
concept with no military aspects attached, and this extended the idea of “security” so 
much that it appeared to encompass almost everything–except military affairs. This early 
definition attracted the criticism that the concept of human security was too broad and 
practically impossible to operationalize. Criticisms of the concept are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter III of this thesis. 
In 1996-1997, the concept was reshaped into a more action-oriented 
methodology.34 As pointed out in Chapter I, this was done largely by Canadian experts 
and officials. Numerous academic institutions, think tanks, and research foundations 
dedicated to human security are home-ported in Canada. In 1998 a meeting in Lysoen, 
Norway, was dedicated to achieving international recognition of–and cooperation on–
issues affecting civilian populations in war zones such as landmines, child soldiers, etc.35 
Eleven nations attended and became the core of the emerging “human security network.” 
These nations were Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Slovenia, South Africa (participating only in the capacity of an observer), Switzerland, 
and Thailand. Through subsequent meetings and activities, this group of countries made 
significant strides towards refining the theory of human security, and some even 
undertook “national human security projects both inside and outside the UN 
structures.”36 The 1999 HDR (though primarily focused on the theme of globalization)  
 
 
                                                 
33 Stettinius cited in Human Development Report 1994, 3. 




also mentioned human security as one of the five elements needed in a new international 
architecture by stating that strengthening the UN system would give “it greater coherence 
to respond to broader needs of human security.”37  
As noted in Chapter I, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), chaired by Gareth Evans, President and Chief Executive of the 
Brussels-based International Crisis Group, and Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian who then 
served as Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, played an even larger role in the 
improvement and refinement of the human security concept. In 2001, the ICISS 
published a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This report postulated an 
international ethical obligation to defend and protect people when their national 
governments fail to do so. According to the report, “Where a population is suffering 
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the 
state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”38 Referring to both “intervention” 
and “sovereignty” in the same statement tends to make governments uneasy, so the report 
addressed this delicate issue by specifying a definition of sovereignty as follows: 
[S]overeignty is more than just a functional principle of international 
relations … [T]he conditions under which sovereignty is exercised–and 
intervention is practiced–have changed dramatically since 1945 … It is 
acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally–to 
respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the 
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international 
human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, 
sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility.39  
As mentioned in Chapter I, the terrorist attacks against the United States on 
September 11, 2001 turned attention away from deliberations on human security for a 
while. However, it must be noted that the ICISS report was published after these events 
and even referred to them. The ICISS report states that:  
                                                 
37 Human Development Report (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press for the United 
Nations Development Programme, 1999), 111. 
38 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility 
to Protect, 200, http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf, xi. 
39 Ibid., 7-8.  
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[H]uman security is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a 
humanitarian catastrophe occurring ‘in a faraway country of which we 
know little.’ On 11 September 2001 global terrorism, with its roots in 
complex conflicts in distant lands, struck the U.S. homeland: impregnable 
lines of continental defence proved an illusion even for the world’s most 
powerful state.40 
In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a 
report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. This report revived the 
debate about human security and built on the work of the ICISS. The report declared that 
the concept of sovereignty has evolved to include a sense of ethical obligations. 
“Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise 
to the notion of state sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State 
to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider 
international community.”41 This document went beyond the ICISS report by 
incorporating both the newer concept of “human security” and the traditional concept of 
“state security.” Moreover, it declared that a “threat” is “any event or process that leads 
to large scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of 
the international system” and noted that “today’s threats recognize no national 
boundaries.”42 It follows logically that since the threats have spilled out into the 
international arena, the responsibility for dealing with them, whatever they may be, has 
done so as well. According to the report, “The collective security we seek to build today 
asserts a shared responsibility on the part of all States and international institutions, and 
those who lead them, to do just that (fulfill the rights of citizens).”43 
                                                 
40 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 5. The phrase “in a 
faraway country of which we know little” refers to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s notorious 
remarks about Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1938. 
41 Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, 2004, 21-22. 
42 Ibid., synopsis. 
43 Ibid., 22. 
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D. VARIOUS VIEWS ON THE DEFINITION AND MEANING OF THE 
TERM 
Since 1994, when the term “human security” first appeared, governments, 
scholars and interest groups have published analyses of the meaning and merits of the 
concept. One of the more prevalent ways of classifying the various conceptions of human 
security is to bifurcate them into “broad” vs. “narrow” categories. This method of 
classification is often adopted by national governments and/or non-governmental 
organizations. 
Three countries, as well as several NGOs, come up repeatedly in the literature 
about “human security” –Canada, Japan, and Norway. Canada and Norway are among the 
countries with active foreign policy concerns and agendas that emphasize the “freedom 
from fear” aspect of human security. This definition of the term is commonly referred to 
as the “Canadian” or “narrow” approach. Japan and the World Bank both pursue the dual 
edged approach of “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” though in different 
ways. The Japanese, World Bank, and Third World interpretation of the concept is 
generally accepted as the “Japanese” or “broad” approach to human security. 
According to Andrew Mack, the current Director of the Human Security Report 
Project at Simon Fraser University and formerly the Director of Strategic Planning in the 
Executive Office of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “Japan … stresses the 
importance of development issues and ‘human dignity’ and has been critical of Canada’s 
approach to human security, which it sees as associated with humanitarian 
intervention.”44 The broad, or Japanese, approach centers more on the initial wording of 
the 1994 UNDP Report, and the seven components of human security that it spelled out 
to protect the “vital core” of the individual. The “vital core” is a term that appears 
frequently in the literature on human security; and, according to Alkire, it is 
 
                                                 
44 Andrew Mack, “The Concept of Human Security” [in] M. Brozoska and, P. J. Croll, “Promoting 
Security: But How and For Whom?” Contributions to BICC’s Ten Years Anniversary Conference, Bonn 
International Center for Conversion, 2004, 10. 
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a non-technical term for the concerns that lie behind human security. … 
Elements of the vital core are fundamental human rights which all persons 
and institutions are obliged to respect or provide, even if the obligations 
are not perfectly specifiable. The rights and freedoms in the vital core 
pertain to survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity.45 
Or, as Liotta and Owen put it, “the core remains on the human citizen and his or her 
ability to live without hindrance to one’s personal well-being, whatever the cause.”46 
Though such a level of security is an admirable goal, perhaps the only way to truly 
achieve this would be to do away with war and discord all together. 
The World Bank first added to the discourse on human security in its Post-
Conflict Unit’s 1999 paper entitled Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable 
Development: Challenges for the New Millennium. According to this paper,  
the traditional notions of security (threats to the state, military defense, 
and nuclear disarmament) are giving way to contemporary understandings 
of the term (“human,” or personal, security; freedom from crime, violence, 
and oppression). Today, security comprises two interrelated concepts: the 
state’s role in protecting its borders from external threats and its role in 
ensuring “human security” for its citizens under the broader umbrella of 
human rights–meaning that every person is entitled to be free of 
oppression, violence, hunger, poverty, and disease and to live in an clean 
and healthy environment.47 
Subsequently in 2001 in the publication of its World Development Report 2000/1,48 the 
World Bank contributed “organic fusion of hitherto disparate areas of study” to the field 
of human security by using the word “security to refer not narrowly to economic security 
for vulnerable populations, but also to conflict prevention and/or resolution.”49  
The Canadian approach seeks to establish a clear distinction between human 
security and the much broader, previously established field of international development 
by principally restricting the parameters of human security to violent threats against the 
                                                 
45 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 3. 
46 Liotta and Owen, 90; emphasis added. 
47 World Bank Post-Conflict Unit, Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: 
Challenges for the New Millennium (Washington, DC: The World Bank, September 1999), 7. 
48 World Bank, www.worldbank.org . 
49 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 18. 
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individual. These threats can have a multitude of origins, from drug trade and small arms 
trafficking, to ethnic strife and state failure.50 The Human Security Report Project, of the 
School for International Studies at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, explains the 
need for a narrower approach as follows: 
Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have increasingly taken 
place within, and not between, states. National security remains important, 
but in a world in which war between states is the rare exception, and many 
more people are killed by their own governments than by foreign armies, 
the concept of 'human security' has been gaining greater recognition. 
Unlike traditional concepts of security, which focus on defending borders 
from external military threats, human security is concerned with the 
security of individuals. 
For some proponents of human security, the key threat is violence; for 
others the threat agenda is much broader, embracing hunger, disease and 
natural disasters. Largely for pragmatic reasons, the Human Security 
Report Project has adopted the narrower concept of human security that 
focuses on protecting individuals and communities from violence.51 
Canada and Norway remain the two most vocal governments promoting human 
security. Norway has a narrow approach to human security similar to that of Canada, and 
remains the concept’s most fervent supporter in Europe. This is evident in the numerous 
references to the concept in official Norwegian government statements. The narrow 
approach to human security concentrates on “the more immediate necessity for 
intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for 
sustainable and secure development.”52 The Canadian and Norwegian governments 
choose to be more focused and practical in their approach, rather than adopting the broad 
and idealistic approach favored by Japan, the World Bank, and the Third World. The 
Canadian government’s resolve and dedication to human security is discussed at greater 
length in Chapter IV. 
                                                 
50 Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 91. 
51 From the Human Security Report Project’s definition of Human Security, www.hsrgroup.org. 
52 Liotta and Owen, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes on Human Security,” 91. 
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While the scholarly debates and opinions offered throughout the literature are 
abundant, certain studies appear particularly noteworthy. 
As noted earlier, Emma Rothschild contributed greatly to the discussion of human 
security by analyzing it in an impartial and scholarly manner. She avoided treating it with 
the enthusiasm of a novelty, in contrast with many other authors. She proposed the term 
“extended security” and drew parallels with historical events that illustrate security 
concepts. She demonstrated that human security can be regarded as an extension of 
traditional state-based security in Europe. However, she also attempted to make human 
security more viable and palatable by narrowing what the term covers. In her cornerstone 
work, she raised significant questions with regard to authority, consensus building, 
resource generation, coercion, and subsidiarity.53  
Gary King, the David Florence Professor of Government at Harvard University 
and Director of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, and Christopher J. L. 
Murray, a professor of global health at the University of Washington and formerly the 
director of the Harvard Initiative for Global Health at Harvard University, have formed a 
more multidimensional view of human security, which would fall within the category of 
“broad” interpretations. They advocate using a human security index that measures the 
years lived outside “a state of generalized poverty” and that includes “only those domains 
of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put 
their lives or property at great risk.”54 Put another way, their metric would identify a 
person as insecure if he falls below a minimum level in any of their specified domains of 
health, education, income, political freedom, and democracy. Their proposed method 
differs from the more commonly used metric developed by Mahbub ul Haq and his 
collaborators in authoring the 1994 Human Development Report.  
Caroline Thomas, a recently deceased professor of global politics at Southampton 
University who devoted her career to the plight of the poor and disadvantaged in 
developing nations, also argued for a broad interpretation of human security. This was 
                                                 
53 Rothschild, “What is Security?,” 53-98. 
54 Gary King and Christopher Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116, 
no. 4 (Winter 2002): 593, 594; emphasis in original. 
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motivated by her view that available international means to deal with mounting 
inequality, caused by globalization, were inadequate. Her definition, which is similar to 
the original concept of the 1994 UNDP document, was as follows: 
Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material 
needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful 
participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while 
material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the 
concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative 
whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive 
notion of democracy, and is directly engaged with discussions of 
democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.55 
This seems so far-reaching that it virtually encompasses all of Abraham Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs,56 supplemented by a global democratic system. 
Jennifer Leaning, a Professor of the Practice of International Health at the 
Harvard School of Public Health who has written extensively on the topics of disaster 
response and human rights, and Sam Arie, a widely published author on Africa, have 
discussed human security especially, though not exclusively, as it pertains to Africa. 
They stipulate that human security is an “underlying condition” of human development, 
but their definition comprises cultural and psychological security issues that stem from 
social systems and perceptions of the future, as opposed to considering only basic 
standards of living.57 Their work highlights a need to consider cultural and psychological 
aspects, but without weakening the focus and compactness of human security 
requirements as a “minimal set.” 
                                                 
55 Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security the Challenge of Poverty 
and Inequality (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), xi; in Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for 
Human Security, 15. 
56 Maslow's hierarchy of needs is a theory in psychology, proposed by Abraham Maslow in a paper 
entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370-96. It is often 
depicted as a pyramid consisting of five levels: the lowest level is associated with physiological needs, 
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the pyramid are met. 
57 Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and 
Transition (New Orleans, Louisiana: Complex Emergency Response and Transition Initiative, Tulane 
University, December 2000). 
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Canadian researcher Fen Osler Hampson, a professor at the Norman Paterson 
School of International Affairs at Carleton University and a past fellow at the United 
States Institute of Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and his co-
authors define human security as a public good that protects core human values, such as 
physical security, basic liberties, and economic needs and interests, but that is not being 
provided to a large number of people.58 According to Hampson et al., “the concept of 
‘security’ can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the 
most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual.”59 In summary, they 
propose a “portfolio diversification approach to human security.”60 
Roland Paris, a Professor at the University of Ottawa and the founding director of 
the university’s Centre for International Policy Studies, suggests that all too often human 
security is defined by attaching it to a certain set of pre-established values and that it 
thereby loses its neutrality. He prefers that it not be viewed as a theoretical notion, but 
rather advocates treating it as a category of research into military and non-military threats 
to states, societies, groups, and individuals. He has constructed a simple grid or graphic 
representation of approaches to security studies, including traditional, military, redefined, 
and human security. The “redefined” security approach is also known as the Copenhagen 
School. This grid is often reproduced in the pertinent literature. In this simple two-by-two 
matrix he shows that the concepts are not mutually exclusive, and that they have 
significant overlap in terms of threats and those affected. He holds that numerous 
definitions of human security can and should exist, and points to several sub-fields in 
need of research.61 
 
 
                                                 
58 Fen Osler Hampson, with Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Todd Martin, and Holly Reid, Madness in 
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59 Ibid., 4. 
60 Ibid., 59-62. 
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The International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) discussed 
earlier presented human security as a fundamentally promising concept for national and 
international institutions and governments. This position was bolstered by pointing to the 
statement by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that 
For the United Nations, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment 
and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of 
conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the 
promotion of human development. Ensuring human security is, in the 
broadest sense, the United Nations cardinal mission. Genuine and lasting 
prevention is the means to achieve that mission.62 
Annan’s statement was taken as an official sanctioning of the concept. “Human Security” 
as it relates specifically to the European Union. 
European integration has at times in the past century been dubbed a “peace 
project.” For, out of the ashes and horror of the two great World Wars, European citizens 
and leaders alike fervently strove to reinvent the socio-political loom and weave a new 
fabric that would this time truly and above all prevent another war on European soil. 
Thus, the phoenix that is now the European Union was engendered. As Anand Menon, a 
Professor of West European Politics and Director of the European Research Institute at 
the University of Birmingham, and Special Adviser to the House of Lords EU committee, 
and his co-authors put it, the EU is “a pioneer in long term interstate building, a pioneer 
actor through trial and error and thus designing options for peaceful governance. In this 
vision, the EU is one of the most formidable machines for managing differences 
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As far as human security in the European Union is concerned, it is 
believed that a wide variety of European soft power factors, such as 
democracy, promotion of human rights and cultural, social, economic 
values, etc. were reasons why the EU started to be interested in human 
security in both, Canadian and Japanese, approaches.64 
Indeed, the very bedrock that the EU is founded on is fertile ground for the 
concept of human security to have taken hold and possibly flourish, as is seen in the very 
wording of the Amsterdam Treaty, which states that “the Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law.”65 Even the realm of foreign policy is expressly discussed in terms of 
human rights and by extension human security in that, according to the treaty, “The 
Union shall define and implement a common foreign policy and security policy covering 
all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be … to develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”66 It also bears mentioning that respect for human rights figures so 
prominently in the EU psyche as to be one of the Copenhagen criteria,67 the required 
benchmarks that must be met for entry into the European Union.  
Until recently the geopolitical order of the Cold War placed certain constraints on 
the autonomy of the states participating in the European Integration movement and 
precluded, or at the very least did not encourage, the development of a European Security 
and Defense Identity (ESDI). Arrangements supporting an ESDI were pursued under the 
auspices of NATO and the Western European Union from 1990 to 1999. Since 1999, the 
European Union has been marching steadily forward, if somewhat slowly and 
sporadically, toward a more ambitious European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).68 
Though the specific term “human security” was not used in the European Security 
                                                 
64 Marczuk, “Origin, Development and Perspectives for the Human Security Concept in the European 
Union,” 21; emphasis in original. 
65 Amsterdam Treaty, Title I, Article 6, http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf. 
66 Amsterdam Treaty, Title V, Article 11. 
67 The Copenhagen Criteria, 
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Strategy policy document of December 2003, Sven Biscop, a Professor of European 
Security at the University of Gent and a Senior Researcher for the Belgian Royal Institute 
for International Relations, holds that it was “implicitly present.” According to Biscop, 
human security can be a useful organizing concept, binding everything 
together and explaining the core aim of the EU’s holistic approach as a 
global actor: making sure that every individual, everywhere, has access to 
physical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social 
wellbeing. To realize this for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of 
the EU; to realize it for citizens worldwide is the means to safeguard that 
interest and, at the same time, a positive agenda in its own right.69 
In 2004, the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities released a report 
entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study 
Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. According to Matlary, this document 
“represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on 
individual rights to security–not only in terms of policy and legal principles (as the ICISS 
report does) but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration.”70 Though 
Liotta and Owen point out that the European Union had tried to implement some 
elements of human security earlier, it was not until the publication of the 2003 ESS and 
2004 Barcelona Report that the EU “declared inherent security values in both promoting 
the rights of nation-states and in protecting the rights of individual citizens.”71 The 
Barcelona Report states, “In today’s world, there is a gap between current security 
capabilities, consisting largely of military forces, and real security needs.”72 
The Barcelona Report also explains why the idea of human security became a 
topic of note in Europe around 2004-2005 by observing that “In an era of global 
interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are 
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insecure.”73 Dan Henk, a Professor of Leadership at the U.S. Air War College, has noted 
that “The Europeans are looking at the world–and their role in it–in a significantly new 
way.”74 With the statement that “Europe has a historic responsibility to contribute to a 
safer and more just world,”75 the report argues that the European Union should become a 
more active participant on the global security scene, and that it needs the capability to do 
so, including military forces. The report discusses how these conventional forces should 
be built differently from currently available forces and used in new and innovative ways. 
Specifically, the report proposes a “Human Security Doctrine” for the European Union 
with three components: 
A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity 
that apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of 
human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up 
approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate 
use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up 
approach; on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with 
the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence 
gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and 
sustainability. 
A ‘Human Security Response Force’, initially composed of 15,000 men 
and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, legal 
experts, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). 
The Force would be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities 
already made available by member states as well as a proposed ‘Human 
Security Volunteer Service’. 
A new legal framework to govern both decisions to intervene and 
operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host 
states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 76  
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By specifying “capabilities” in the form of force structure, organization, and a legal 
framework, this doctrine represents an ambitious initiative to respond to challenges and 
resolve crises. The report maintains a direct connection with the 2003 ESS by focusing 
on the same threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing 
states, and organized crime. 
In December 2008, the European Council issued a Report on the Implementation 
of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World.77 This 
report left the wording of the December 2003 ESS unchanged and expressly stated that it 
“does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it” and that the ESS “is comprehensive in its 
approach and remains fully relevant.”78 This report specifically mentions human security 
twice. First, in the Executive Summary, the report states, “We have worked to build 
human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and 
human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and 
insecurity.”79 Second, in Chapter III the report declares, “We need to continue 
mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, 
through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security.”80 
E. CANADA’S RECENT AND PROMINENT USE OF THE TERM “HUMAN 
SECURITY” 
In addition to European Union documents, note should be taken of the recent 
report by the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also know as 
the “Manley Report” owing to the name of the Honorable John Manley, who chaired the 
study group. In this report, human security is mentioned in two of the four reasons for 
why Canada (and perhaps other external powers) should maintain a security presence in 
Afghanistan. According to this report, the second reason for Canadian involvement is that  
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Canadians are in Afghanistan in support of the United Nations, 
contributing to the UN’s capacity to respond to threats to peace and 
security and to foster better futures in the world’s developing countries. … 
This is a peace-enforcement operation, as provided for under Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter. It is a collective use of force, under 
international law, to address a threat to international peace and security 
posed by continuing disorder in Afghanistan. … In fact, these are the 
kinds of force the UN might be called upon to apply more often in future, 
where the human rights and human security of ordinary people are 
threatened.81 
Further, according to this report, “There is a fourth and equally powerful reason for 
Canadian engagement [in Afghanistan]: the promotion and protection of human security 
in fragile states.”82  
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III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONCERNS 
Chapter II of this thesis surveyed the principal definitions of human security and 
their historical context. The purpose of this chapter is to subject these definitions to a 
critical analysis. The chapter considers the following types of criticisms: substantive 
reservations about the main implications, scholarly concerns related to the intellectual 
coherence of the human security concept, and questions about its relevance for the 
European Union’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
A. QUESTIONS OF ETHICS 
Many criticisms of the human security concept have been levied. One of the more 
general ones is that the ethical framework appears arbitrary and suspiciously convenient. 
Supposedly, human security represents an ethical and righteous superiority over 
traditional or state-centered security. As Liotta and Owen put it, 
On the one hand, ethics collectively involves codes of values, morality, 
religion, history, tradition, and even language. Such an ethical system that 
enforces, as it were, human security inevitably collides with conflicting 
values–which are not synchronous or accepted by all individuals, states, 
societies, or regions. Pragmatically, enforcement of these values, or the 
perceived right to even make these judgments, is contested. On the other 
hand, in the once widely accepted, and still dominant, realist 
understanding, the state was the sole guarantor of security. Indeed, 
security extended downward from nations to individuals; conversely, the 
stable state extended upward in its relationship to other states to influence 
the security of the international system. This broadly characterizes what is 
known as the anarchic order.  
Yet individual security, stemming from the liberal thought of the 
Enlightenment, was also considered both a unique and collective good. 
The responsibility, however, for the guarantee of the individual good–
under any security rubric–has never been obvious.83 
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Matlary voices similar concerns by asking, “if human security is paraded in 
rhetoric but has no policy effect, is not the rhetorical exercise itself the more 
unethical?”84 She also maintains that, “if rhetoric promises more than policy can deliver, 
the ethical implications are grave.”85 The basis for her critique is her view that human 
security does not really represent a new or improved approach to understanding or 
providing security. While this specific criticism of human security will be discussed in 
more detail shortly, it must be mentioned here because Matlary directly links the these 
two issues by stating that “the more it [human security] is employed in political rhetoric, 
the more ethically questionable this becomes, since it is not implemented in security 
policy in any new way.”86 Note should, however, be taken of the fact that her comments 
predate the prominent use of the term human security in the 2008 report on the 
implementation of the European Security Strategy. Moreover, as noted in Chapter II, the 
term was also employed in a recent official statement made by a panel established by the 
Canadian government. These EU and Canadian statements indicate that the notion is in 
fact being taken seriously as an element of obligation and aspiration. Perhaps a little 
patience and less accusatory language are in order. After all, if the implementation of the 
concept was hurried and done without sufficient reflection, that might in itself discredit 
the concept. A deliberate approach gives the concept a fair chance to prove its merits. 
B. LARGE POWERS VS. MIDDLE POWERS 
It is a sad truth that perception sometimes matters more than reality, and that the 
identity of the actor sometimes matters more than what the action is or the motivation 
behind it. In this vein, certain scholars have argued that reactions to the concept of human 
security may derive as much from the identity of the proponent as from what the concept 
fundamentally represents. The accusation is that so-called “middle power” states such as 
Norway, Canada, and most of the member states of the European Union are using human 
security and other ethical, moralistic, or utopian concepts as a means to distinguish 
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themselves from the “larger” or “great” powers and to assert a moral superiority over 
them, since they clearly cannot compete with them on more traditional security criteria 
such as military might. As Liotta and Owen put it, 
Such so-called “middle power” states, after all, can exercise significant 
moral clout by emphasizing that the rights of the individual are at least as 
important as protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of the state. 
Yet when larger powers, particularly those with significant militaries (such 
as the United States or the United Kingdom) advocate similar positions, it 
is their overwhelming power that is recognized, respected, and resented. 
On the one hand, what is perceived as the “moral clout” of the middle 
power is sensed as “hegemony unbridled” when it is emphasized in an 
attempted similar fashion by major powers. On the other hand, when 
actions taken in the name, or in the principled following, of human 
security do occur, they often are inextricably linked to issues that are 
embedded in the more traditional concepts of “national security” and 
protection of the state.87 
Whether or not it is indeed true that certain middle powers are using human 
security merely as a means of gaining a distinctive identity in relation to the larger 
powers, one must point out that, regardless of their good intentions, exactly this “clout” 
exerted by the middle powers makes them members of the club of intervening external 
powers, much as in colonial times. Liotta and Owen hit the nail on the head when they 
succinctly remarked that “Idealism thus becomes enmeshed in realism; actions taken on 
behalf of the powerless are determined only by the powerful.”88 As Matlary states, 
certain actions have been described as “human security operations, but military force is, 
as we can document in the scholarly literature, very rarely deployed for purely 
humanitarian purposes.”89 
As previously mentioned, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty popularized the Responsibility to Protect concept, which holds that it is the 
duty of external agencies or other states, including the members of the United Nations, to 
make the security that sovereign states owe to their citizens a reality. As noted 
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previously, this admirable and necessary notion raises issues with regard to crossing 
boundaries between ethical responsibility (to protect) and legal obligations (to respect the 
state’s right to sovereignty). As Liotta and Owen observe, “In the topology of power, 
dominant states will likely continue to intervene at the time and place of their 
choosing.”90 One might hope that this choice of when to act may increasingly, though not 
necessarily exclusively, be motivated by altruistic ends. Ayn Rand pointed out that the 
“virtue of selfishness”91 can be taken to mean that the desire to feel a sense of satisfaction 
when performing acts of charity is in and of itself virtuous because it causes good things 
to happen. Nations should be afforded the same consideration as individuals, in that 
regard for one's own welfare need not imply disregard for the well-being of others. In this 
respect, Bailes notes that Robert Cooper, a British diplomat who in 2002 assumed the 
role of Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, “famously pointed out … [that] to 
survive in a still largely unreconstructed world the good may need to pursue a kind of 
rational selfishness requiring acts of ‘old-style’ zero-sum competition, bullying and 
coercion or even violence towards others.”92 Such an approach may be acceptable as a 
temporary measure, but only during a transitory phase. 
C. IS HUMAN SECURITY AS A SPECIFIC FIELD SUPERFLUOUS? 
Some have argued that human security “overpopulates an area that is already 
adequately addressed by state security, human development, and human rights initiatives, 
causing needless confusion and competing for scarce resources.”93 Other critisisms that 
have been expressed against the notion are that it is “unnecessary” and “redundant.” 
Here it is crucial to accept that of course there are overlaps and interrelationships 
between the concept of human security and concepts of state security, human 
development and human rights.  
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There are various non-conceptual ways of distinguishing these three 
approaches: disciplinary, historical, and institutional. For example, 
whereas human development tends to be undertaken by activists and social 
scientists, and human rights by activists and lawyers and political 
scientists, state security studies described practitioners and scholars of 
defence and strategic studies, intelligence, and international relations. The 
disciplines that predominate in any of the areas shape the expertise and 
method of scholarship devoted to an area. Furthermore, the instruments 
and institutions that support each agenda differ: human development 
involves nongovernmental development organizations, sector-specific 
agencies in governments, overseas development assistance. Human rights 
mobilizes the international legal framework, UN Conventions, human 
rights organizations and legal instruments. State security mobilizes foreign 
policy, military expenditures, and defence and intelligence departments.94  
Alkire firmly asserts that while these distinctions are vital, “one of the distinctions of 
human security from each of the other three approaches will be the unique blend of 
disciplines and institutions it engages.”95 As noted in Chapter II, King, Murray, and 
Thomas recognize conflict-related threats and, in the spirit of the 1994 UNDP, stress the 
fact that poverty is a root cause of conflict. As Alkire points out, 
The key elements that they have adopted are the focus on the co-
reasonability of elements of multidimensional human security–in other 
words, that security is achieved only when all of them are in place–and the 
individual focus of human security, which is not amenable to the 
aggregate indices often used in Human Development.96 
The 2000 UNDP Report bore the subtitle of Human Rights and Human 
Development, and discussed the interrelationship of the two, as well as human security, at 
great length.  
D. MORE SPECIFIC SCHOLARLY CRITICISMS OF HUMAN SECURITY 
Paris has reviewed much of the skeptical literature. One of the common critiques 
of the human security concept is the question, on what grounds are the various domains 
of concern chosen? Paris is quite critical of authors such as King, Murray, and Thomas, 
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who identify certain values as more important than others, without offering a clear and 
logical justification. He holds that their process of identifying elements of human security 
is not sufficiently elaborated, and that not enough light is shed on how their definitions 
evolve. Concerning vagueness, he writes, 
Human security is like “sustainable development”–everyone is for it, but 
few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of 
human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-
being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the 
prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of 
what, exactly, is to be studied.97 
However, it is of interest to note that the 1994 HDR itself addresses this issue by stating 
that 
Several analysts have attempted rigorous definitions of human security. 
But like other fundamental concepts, such as human freedom, human 
security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence. 
And most people instinctively understand what security means.98 
Though the latter part of this statement may be debatable, Alkire seems to agree with 
parts of this HDR statement by noting that the very vagueness of the concept of human 
security “may also have positive value, by holding together an otherwise disparate 
coalition of interests.”99  
As to the concept’s incoherence, Paris points out that in trying to narrow the 
definition of the human security notion, many authors do not “provide a compelling 
rationale for highlighting certain values”100 over others. He specifically questions the 
cogency of the analysis by Murray and King: “their decision to exclude indicators of 
violence from their composite measure of human security creates a de facto distinction 
between human security and physical security, thereby purging the most familiar 
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connotation of security–safety from violence–from their definition of human security.”101 
Paris is not alone in formulating this objection, for, according to Alkire, “Buzan, Weaver, 
and de Wilde, who review criticisms of ‘wide approaches’ (not necessarily human 
security) from traditional security literature, find this [incoherence] to be one of the two 
main criticisms.”102 
The criticism as to the theory’s arbitrariness has been well expressed by Lawrence 
Freedman. In his words, “Once anything that generates anxiety or threatens the quality of 
life in some respect becomes labeled a ‘security problem,’ the field risks losing all 
focus.”103 Alkire raises pertinent questions: 
When the potential set of critical and pervasive threats is so wide, by what 
criteria is a small subset of these chosen for consideration? So often the 
importance of a particular human security threat is argued in isolation 
from other threats, or threats appear to be chosen arbitrarily or in response 
to the interests of those responsible. It seems that the criteria of selection 
could include a wide range of considerations. Some are predictive: the 
probability of a threat occurring, the extent and depth of insecurity that is 
likely to result, and the duration of it. Some are perceptive: what human 
insecurities do people feel most strongly about? Some are ethical: will 
threats further exacerbate? Some are simply pragmatic: what is the relative 
cost of preventing threats; how feasible is it that prevention will be 
successful?104 
Some discussions of–and proposed answers to–the critical questions were uttered 
by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, the Director of the Program for Peace and Human Security 
(formerly the Center for Peace and Human Security) at the CERI (Centre d’Etudes et 
Recherches Internationales) in Paris, at a UNESCO forum entitled “Human Security: 60 
Minutes to Convince” in 2005. In her short paper, she describes seven challenges to 
operationalizing the concept of human security. Firstly, does the issue of definitional 
consensus matter? She states that, while there is general disagreement on the definition, 
there is no doubt that the point is, 
                                                 
101 Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” 95. 
102 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 22. 
103 Lawrence Freedman, “International Security: Changing Targets,” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring 
1998): 53. 
104 Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, 22. 
 36
that there should be a shift of attention from a state-centered to a people-
centered approach to security, that concern with the security of state 
borders should give way to concern with the security of the people who 
live within those borders. …At the end of the day, perhaps human security 
may prove to be more effective as a broad flexible framework rather than 
being codified in rigorous terms, but we need to recognize that we are not 
referring to one concept or paradigm but rather an approach.105 
Secondly, Tadjbakhsh asks, how does the resurgence of “national security” affect 
“human security?” She suggests that globally “increased attention paid to the war against 
terrorism has now raised concerns that development policies risk being subordinated to a 
narrow security agenda, with aid allocated according to geo-strategic priorities.”106 She 
implies that this is not a positive development because it diverts attention from human 
security priorities.  
Third is the question of responsibility. Tadjbakhsh finds it odd that in the flurry of 
discussion on human security the idea of individual empowerment is strangely absent. 
“Discussions around human security put too little emphasis on empowerment and on the 
agency approach, of the role of individuals as agents of change. An expanded notion of 
human security requires growing recognition of the role of people–of individuals and 
communities–in ensuring their own security.”107  
Fourthly, Tadjbakhsh discusses the question of prioritizing and give and take. She 
argues that “to ‘hierarchize’ and prioritize among human security goals may be a futile 
exercise, as the concept is based on the postulate that all threats are interdependent: the 
eradication of one of them is of little effect without the implementation of a 
comprehensive framework.”108 She suggests that the task of prioritizing and “Policy-
making should not be a vertical process but a networked, flexible and horizontal coalition 
of approaches corresponding to a complex paradigm.”109 
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Tadjbakhsh’s fifth question addresses the possibility of achieving an “inter-
sectoral agenda.” In her words, “It is not enough to design programs that include 
education, health, sciences, media, [and] poverty as part of a ‘holistic’ package. It is more 
important to look at the relationships, how interventions in one sphere can actually have 
externalities, both positive and negative, on other areas, and what causalities could be in 
order to better design human security interventions.”110 She rightly points out that 
government bureaucracies and donor agencies not only do not understand each other, but 
lack the experience and know-how to work well together. 
Tadjbakhsh’s sixth point concerns the failure to comprehend what conflict really 
is and how it arises, and how this failure leads to an inability to prevent it. “Very often we 
fail to understand the impact of conflicts on changing social norms and fail to integrate 
preventive measures in post-conflict stabilization programs.”111  
Tadjbakhsh’s seventh and final argument is that care must be taken to provide 
help vice harm. “The best that international organizations can do for the cause of human 
security is actually not to increase more insecurities by failing to coordinate properly 
between partners and between sectors. The ultimate challenge is to make sure that 
interventions do no harm.”112 
Tadjbakhsh’s statements are at such a high level of abstraction and so logically 
convoluted that some readers may find them confusing and unhelpful. 
E. CRITICISMS OF HUMAN SECURITY AS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY 
TO THE EU AND ESDP  
The previously mentioned questions regarding the ethical issues surrounding the 
human security debate apply in particular to the EU and its ESDP. Alyson J. K. Bailes, 
formerly the British Ambassador to Finland, political director of the Western European 
Union and until recently director of the well known Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, voices several critiques in a recently published article entitled “The 
                                                 




EU and a ‘Better World’: What role for the European Security and Defense Policy?” She 
indicates that the EU and the ESPD are simultaneously reflecting two competing views in 
one policy: on the one hand, Realism, assuming that the ESDP is solely supporting the 
national interests of the EU member states; and on the other, Idealism, assuming that 
ESDP missions are motivated by the desire to create a better world. In her view, in ESDP 
and the EU’s human security doctrine there is a great contradiction between ambition and 
reality, and many “convenient” choices both in language and action. 
A number of EU nations, including Germany, Austria, Spain and 
doubtless some of the new members, also seem to regard missions ‘close 
to home’ as inherently more legitimate; but what are the moral grounds for 
this, when cases further abroad might involve greater breaches of security 
and human rights and reap greater ‘added value’ from an EU military 
input as such?113 
Bailes also points out that the EU sometimes hurts the same states and individuals 
with its trade and immigration policies that it claims to protect with its ESDP and human 
security doctrine. According to Bailes, 
the point here is that the EU has chosen to be–with important exceptions 
like climate policy and some development aid–just as self-serving in its 
non-defence global policies as it strives to be altruistic in its defence and 
security ones. In any other context the word hypocrisy would swiftly come 
to mind.114 
Bailes offers some insight into why the EU has developed such double standards. 
Basically it can be summed up by saying that it is in the nature of the institution. She 
states that some of the double standards of EU policy can be explained by a need to 
maintain cohesion, image, and self-confidence, but what she takes issue with is that the 
EU markets this as “ethical” behavior. This is glaringly apparent in her statement that  
There is a strong impression that the EU’s more militarily active members 
are deliberately casting the ESDP in the role of the ‘nice cop’: as the 
shopfront where they advertise themselves as friendly and ‘safe’ 
interveners, with bloodied hands discreetly held behind backs. This kind 
of double-think may be highly utilitarian in terms of maintaining the EU’s 
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coherence, self-confidence and image: but this author would hesitate to 
call it ethical behaviour on the part of either the states that practise it or the 
EU that lends itself to the ploy.115 
However, it must be remembered that the EU is an organization that is built on 
and that breathes consensus among governments and sometimes even national 
populations (by referenda). Bailes acknowledges this, and logically extrapolates that 
“there is no certainty that such a collective entity will ever attain the toughness and rapidity of 
action of a single strategic power.”116 Also, owing to the high standard of living which is 
common in the EU, many Europeans expect the EU to project and establish these same 
conditions abroad. Nevertheless, this presents a pitfall. The question, as Liotta and Owen 
point out, is 
how direct a link must be made between vulnerability abroad and EU 
security. Once the human security doctrine is applied to people outside of 
the EU’s political responsibility, must they justify intervention on national 
security grounds? If so, there are significant difficulties with relying solely 
on the “terrorist breeding ground” argument in guiding an entire foreign 
policy. If not, they will have to move beyond direct causal links to a more 
nuanced argument connecting suffering abroad to security at home.117 
The Barcelona Report seems to decidedly lean toward the “narrow” interpretation of 
human security, and this has been criticized by some scholars as overly restrictive. The 
EU doctrine makes violence against the individual and how to prevent it the center of 
attention by stressing the establishment of legal frameworks and law enforcement, with 
only an occasional use of force mentioned.118 However, the Barcelona Report does state 
that in some circumstances the use of force may be necessary. As Liotta and Owen have 
noted, 
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The report does state that in extreme circumstances, a human security 
intervention may be needed against the more egregious nonviolent threats, 
thus incorporating some aspects of the broader human security 
conceptualization, though notably using the type of threshold suggested 
above as a limiting mechanism.119 
Bailes would criticize this approach as choosing the less demanding tasks and 
disregarding the greater challenges: 
Choosing operations that require relatively little force and risk, or where 
the professional military component is minimized, means ignoring some 
of the literal and metaphorical cries for help that ought to mean most for a 
European sense of values: cases of manifest genocide, as in Darfur, or, 
indeed, violent abuses of human rights and human security going on just 
over the EU’s new frontiers in Chechnya or the Palestinian territories. The 
deliberate choice not to build up more reaction capacity in depth or to 
attend to the further stages of strategic deterrence also creates a risk that 
the EU’s modest forces could end up needing to be rescued themselves if 
things go unexpectedly wrong.120 
The Barcelona Report is, however, specific in regard to expectations and norms. 
This is evident in the three elements listed in the Executive Summary and quoted in 
Chapter II of this thesis. Liotta and Owen therefore conclude that, “By responding simply 
to direct threats, the doctrine itself might be nothing more than a well-thought-through 
intervention force proposal; itself, it would remain little more than a response force to 
react to violence and its aftermath.”121 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the human security enterprise can be summed up by the following 
conclusion: the ambitions are idealistic and hopeful, but as yet vague and inconsistently 
defined, and in need of implementation and action. The idealism should not necessarily 
be held up as a shortcoming, while the need for practical implementation reflects the 
consequences of an evolutionary process. As Alkire puts it, 
Human security [is] best specified procedurally, so that it would be both 
appropriate and feasible. The definition retains many degrees of freedom. 
But concrete situations have far fewer. They are constrained by data sets, 
by political realities, by limited resources and by the needs for urgent 
action. Thus those who criticize human security of “vagueness” are 
requested to consider the practical instances of human security promotion 
by agencies, and even to enter the discussion of what human security 
priorities and responsibilities should be.122 
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) pursued by the European 
Union (EU) is an intergovernmental activity. Compromises are therefore understandably 
greater than in a single state’s policies. It is noteworthy that even Alyson Bailes, who is 
generally highly critical of the EU’s use of the term human security and its selection of 
ESDP missions, concedes, “It is hard to imagine any regional intergovernmental 
institution having a more high-minded and correct prescription than the EU’s for military 
activity.”123 Her reservations and those advanced by other critics seem to be on even 
higher moral ground than that which the EU, the ESDP, and the Barcelona Report claim 
to occupy.  
Double standards are nothing new. As La Rochefoucauld once wrote, “Hypocrisy 
is the homage that vice offers to virtue.”124 Moliere added, “Hypocrisy is a fashionable 
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vice, and all fashionable vices pass for virtues.”125 This does not excuse the vice, but it 
must be recognized that it is perhaps an inescapable aspect of the human condition. The 
states and intergovernmental organizations staffed by human beings are not exempt from 
this condition. Some observers might contend, however, that the EU is far from having 
enough cohesion to choose consciously to be hypocritical in its statements and actions. 
Credit should be given to the EU for the aspirations and ambitions that it has 
expressed. Considering its innate complexity, it is remarkable that the EU has succeeded 
in drafting policy documents such as the European Security Strategy and the Barcelona 
Report, and in conducting various types of ESDP missions around the world. As Bailes 
states, 
Within the ESDP itself, ten out of 14 operations launched up to mid-2007 
were non-military ones–police operations; observer and planning 
missions; assistance missions in the fields of border control, internal law 
and justice (Eurojust-THEMIS in Georgia) and security sector reform 
(EUSEC Congo); and rear-echelon support and advice for the African 
Union’s deployment in Darfur, Sudan. On this showing, it might be argued 
that there is no case to answer in terms of the EU’s becoming over- 
‘militarized’ in any meaningful sense, and certainly no risk of its losing its 
generally peaceful and non-threatening image by this means.126 
The European Union’s apparent determination to maintain a peaceful and police-style 
enforcement posture should not be considered a fault. After all, as Bailes has added, 
Europeans believe in tackling security challenges by methods of ‘effective 
multilateralism’, under the ultimate authority of the United Nations. They 
further believe that no problem can be solved by military force alone, and 
that military methods must be used only as a last-resort adjunct of other, 
‘peaceful’, diplomatic, political, economic and humanitarian measures. All 
these points were stressed partly as a deliberate contrast to and implicit 
criticism of the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002, which assigns a 
far greater role to military power, and claims much greater freedom for 
Washington to use force for its own purposes on its own authority.127 
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Brooks Tigner, the editor of Security Europe, a monthly publication focused on EU 
homeland security policy, technology and business, has argued that the EU is uniquely 
suited to navigate this course. 
The eschatological advantage is that Europeans conceive the fight between 
good and evil in the world, as well as their political “mission” and 
approach to it, in ways that substantially diverge from those of the United 
States. Due to its own more recent history, the Old World has drawn its 
lessons. Thus, Europe is beyond automatic reliance on brute force; it shies 
away from direct confrontation in favor of the collegial; it seeks the 
mantle of legitimacy conferred by multilateral versus bilateral solutions; it 
hands out generous amounts of united foreign aid; and it is always careful 
to stress the need for sustainable growth and a fair division of wealth 
among nations as the keys to international stability and respect for human 
rights.128 
Karina Marczuk hopes that constabulary forces, like the European Gendarmerie Force 
(EGF), could become a tool for providing human security, because the European Union is 
trying to reinforce its “soft power” policy. She discusses the value of the EGF and human 
security in relation to EU-U.S. relations as follows: 
the unique capabilities of the Mediterranean constabulary and, 
consequently, the EGF could be a very attractive partner for the U.S. army 
[units] which conduct a policy of foreign interventions and are still 
seeking a solution to this dilemma: how to stabilize effectively a post 
conflict environment?... Perhaps it will be the EGF, as a practice tool, and 
the human security theory, as a theoretical support, which would allow the 
U.S. to deal successfully with foreign campaigns.129 
In the end, the desire to do good and the aim to uphold ethical and moral 
standards constitute a sound and virtuous point of departure. The implementation of these 
objectives in the EU’s ESDP remains a work in progress. The EU, because of its very 
genesis, history, and composition, may nonetheless be one of the most appropriate 
vehicles to champion this new and enlightened possible way forward. As Bailes puts it, 
the EU has played a “role in creating permanent peace among its own ever-multiplying 
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members,” and the EU benefits from “its demonstration value as embodying the greatest 
step the world has yet seen away from the order based on national sovereignty that 
produced all the modern era’s wars.”130 The fact that the EU is widely perceived to be 
slow, awkward, and dependent on improvisation in pursuing this goal should not 
diminish the validity of the cause. There is, undeniably, much potential for growth, but 
the EU has seen to the germination and solid rooting of the seedling known as human 
security. 
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